Protein from the sea: the global rise of fishmeal and the industrialization of Southeast Pacific fisheries, 1918 - 1973 by Wintersteen, Kristin
desiguALdades.net
Research Network on Interdependent
Inequalities in Latin America
Working Paper Series
Working Paper No. 26, 2012
Protein from the Sea
The Global Rise of Fishmeal and the 
Industrialization of Southeast Pacific Fisheries, 
1918-1973
Kristin Wintersteen
desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series
Published by desiguALdades.net Research Network on Interdependent Inequalities in Latin America 
The desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series serves to disseminate first results of ongoing research 
projects in order to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the 
desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series does not constitute publication and should not limit 
publication in any other venue. Copyright remains with the authors. 
Copyright for this edition: Kristin Wintersteen
Editing and Production: Barbara Göbel / Laura Kemmer / Paul Talcott
All working papers are available free of charge on our website www.desiguALdades.net. 
Wintersteen, Kristin 2012: “Protein from the Sea: The Global Rise of Fishmeal and the Industrialization 
of Southeast Pacific Fisheries, 1918-1973”, desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series, No. 26, 
Berlin: desiguALdades.net Research Network on Interdependent Inequalities in Latin America.
The paper was produced by Kristin Wintersteen during her short-term doctoral scholarship at 
desiguALdades.net from 06/2011-11/2011.
desiguALdades.net Research Network on Interdependent Inequalities in Latin America cannot be 
held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this 
Working Paper; the views and opinions expressed are solely those of the author or authors and do not 
necessarily reflect those of desiguALdades.net.
Protein from the Sea
The Global Rise of Fishmeal and the Industrialization of Southeast Pacific 
Fisheries, 1918-1973
Kristin Wintersteen
Abstract
This paper examines why and how, amidst efforts to combat malnutrition both locally 
and globally, the post-World War II industrialization of Peruvian and Chilean fisheries 
focused ultimately on fishmeal production for animal feed. It highlights the transnational 
entanglements among the visions of key individuals and institutions in the emerging 
postwar international order and explains how these impacted fisheries development at 
the local scale. Despite technical assistance programs by the United Nations Food and 
Agricultural Organization that aimed to create local markets and use fish proteins to 
ameliorate malnutrition, industrialists from both North and South saw greater potential 
in fishmeal as an export commodity for farmed chickens, hogs, and later fish. By 1972, 
when the Peruvian anchoveta collapsed, the coastal waters off Peru and Chile had 
become the world’s primary source of concentrated fish proteins – a hidden but key 
ingredient in the global industrial food web – with serious consequences for local social 
and economic inequalities.
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1. Introduction
An ambitious mission brought Bibiano Fernández Osorio-Tafall, distinguished Spanish 
biologist, to Chile in 1949. Exiled in Mexico after the Spanish Civil War, Osorio-
Tafall left his adopted home to head the regional office of the newly-created United 
Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in Santiago (Pinar 2001). In doing 
so, he joined a new international cadre of civil servants dedicated to tackling what 
they believed to be the single most important issue facing humankind: world hunger. 
Osorio-Tafall was convinced that fisheries would be central to this endeavor. Yet he 
and his FAO colleagues were not the only ones who recognized the value of untapped 
ocean resources off the coast of western South America. Humanitarian desires to use 
the region’s fishes to combat malnutrition through direct local consumption clashed 
with efforts by businessmen and policymakers, from both North and South, to produce 
fishmeal for animal feed. In the 1950s and 60s, these competing visions represented 
vastly different projects for the political economy of the emerging international capitalist 
system: whether the small schooling fishes that flourished in Peruvian and Chilean 
coastal waters would offer a solution to the problem of hunger in the developing world, or 
whether their industrialization represented an opportunity to consolidate new business 
empires based on the rich nutrient base of the Humboldt Current marine ecosystem.
In the aftermath of World War II, food shortages and commodity price swings greatly 
preoccupied political leaders in the North, who were anxious to maintain stability 
as well as to secure the United States’ position as global superpower. For social-
minded international civil servants like Osorio-Tafall, marine fisheries in the Southeast 
Pacific offered hope for improving the production and distribution of food, especially 
proteins, in developing countries. To industrialists on the U.S. West Coast, however, 
investing in Peruvian and Chilean fisheries was an entrepreneurial exercise aimed 
at transforming ocean resources into commercial capital by harvesting, refining, and 
selling them as concentrated proteins to the highest bidder. Observers reported an 
abundance of anchovies off the southern coast of California, but following the sardine 
collapse in the late 1940s and early 50s, the state prohibited the fishing of anchovies 
for fishmeal, while the processing plants and fishing boats of Monterey and San 
Francisco languished in port for lack of raw material. On the other hand, off western 
South America swam immense schools of anchoveta, sardines, and mackerel – ideal 
for fishmeal and oil production – as well as tuna that migrated along the Pacific coast. 
Meanwhile, facing waning local supplies of sardines and tuna, fishing firms in California 
sold or transferred defunct boats, equipment, and even entire processing plants to the 
expanding operations in Peru and Chile.
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Some U.S. West Coast businessmen believed that fishmeal, whether for animal 
feed or as protein concentrates for human consumption, would be a highly lucrative 
investment. Indeed, as U.S. consumption of “white meats” climbed steadily during the 
post-World War II era (Horowitz 2006), specially-formulated feeds that incorporated 
fishmeal replaced the nutrients that free-range animals would otherwise obtain by 
foraging on open land. The proteins in fishmeal allowed chickens and pigs to grow 
in confined spaces, resulting in a faster time-to-market and increased weight – a 
property so poorly understood among researchers that they termed it the “unidentified 
growth factor” (Pensack, Bethke, and Kennard 1948). Beginning in the late 1950s, the 
explosion in fishmeal production using anchoveta and sardines caught off the coast of 
Peru and northern Chile drove down world prices of fishmeal. By the 1960s Peruvian 
fishmeal was a key input in the growing poultry and swine factory farms of the United 
States and Northern Europe. After 1962 fishmeal futures contracts were even being 
traded on the New York and London stock markets, allowing investors in the global 
North to speculate on the fluctuating populations of fish in the Southeast Pacific. 
This paper examines why and how, amidst efforts to combat malnutrition both locally 
and globally, the post-World War II industrialization of Peruvian and Chilean fisheries 
focused ultimately on fishmeal production for animal feed. It presents a paradigmatic 
case of the entanglements of global, national, and local interests as societies 
transformed and exported nature in the form of a commodity that took on central 
importance to the global food industry. As scientists, policymakers, businessmen, and 
fishers worked through (and outside of) state and international institutions to defend 
their interests in Peru-Chile fisheries, new inequalities took shape linking global capital 
to local ecosystems and the people who depend on them. International technocratic 
visions of the potential of Humboldt Current fisheries resources to meet social needs 
clashed with local elites’ desires to use the fish to fuel local industrial development. Yet 
like many of the immigrants who worked in the fishing industry, the region’s wealthiest 
magnates – Luis Banchero Rossi in Peru and Anacleto Angelini in Chile – came 
from Italian backgrounds and built their fortunes on fisheries in their adopted Pacific 
homeland. Ultimately the extraction of resources for export and trade in global futures 
markets was more profitable than strategies encouraging food production for local 
consumption, as infrastructure and technology for preservation and marketing of fish 
products required significant investment. Rapid industrialization and periods of boom 
and bust characterized the post-World War II trajectories of Pacific coastal towns such 
as Chimbote, Peru, Talcahuano, and Iquique, Chile, whose fortunes rose and fell on 
the health of the marine ecosystem that supplied proteins for farmed animals across 
the globe.
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An uneven geography linked the raw proteins of the Humboldt Current to food production 
in distant markets through the global industrial food chain: the availability of cheaper 
chickens, eggs, and pork chops at supermarkets depended on the commodification 
and systematic redistribution of nutrients from this marine ecosystem to livestock and 
fish farms supplying urban centers and other mass markets in the global North and 
East Asia. Fishmeal is thus an important but seldom examined factor in the political 
ecology of the global industrial food web, including the rise and consolidation of U.S. 
agribusiness giants such as Cargill and Ralston Purina during the 1960s and 70s. 
In Peru and Chile, the industry brought about the formation of new national elites. 
Efforts by the FAO and national governments to stimulate direct local consumption 
of fisheries resources, including programs to incorporate “fish protein concentrate” 
(FPC, or fish flour, versions of fishmeal suitable for human consumption) into foods 
for undernourished populations faltered in the face of rising demand for “white meats” 
such as chicken breasts and pork chops in the global North. But with an abundance of 
raw materials and few restrictions on harvest during the fishmeal boom (c. 1957-1972), 
industrialists in both Peru and Chile as well as the United States focused on short-
term profitability, which favored the limited investment required to produce and export 
fishmeal for heavy – if risky – returns. Finally, the collapse of the Peruvian anchoveta 
in 1972 and political turmoil in Chile during the early 1970s ended immediate prospects 
for commercial production of fish flour or FPC for human consumption by 1973.
2. Modern Oceanographic Science in the “Pacific Fisheries 
 Frontier”, 1918-1964
In California the production of fishmeal from sardines became increasingly profitable in 
the years following World War I, when oversupply first encouraged their “reduction” for 
use in animal feeds and fertilizers. The North Pacific sardine fishery, once the largest 
on the U.S. West Coast, supplied the fabled canneries of Monterey, San Francisco, 
and Southern California through the end of World War II. Fish waste and whole fish not 
used in canning became meal, flour, oil, or fertilizer in reduction plants usually owned 
by the canneries themselves. With no restrictions on sardine extraction, production fast 
outpaced demand for canned sardines, and processing of whole fish into meal took off 
after 1918, effectively subsidizing the production of canned fish because depressed 
prices for the latter limited profits in available markets. On the other hand, canneries 
not attached to fishmeal plants could not compete (McEvoy 1986; Ueber and MacCall 
2005).
California authorities opposed the industry’s utilization of edible fish to produce fertilizer 
and animal fodder. The state enacted several pieces of legislation after 1919 strictly 
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limiting the reduction of whole fish to fishmeal (Messersmith 1969). Firms instead 
produced fishmeal from whole sardines on factory ships beyond the jurisdiction of 
California State Law, which extended to three nautical miles. From 1934 to 1946, the 
sardine industry boomed; in the 1936-37 season, fishermen brought in the largest 
single-species catch ever landed off the U.S. West Coast (Ueber and MacCall 2005). 
As much as four-fifths of the total California sardine harvest directly supplied fishmeal 
plants during the 1930s, making the commodity up to 20% cheaper than its closest 
competitor, processed meat scrap, and greatly improving the productivity of California 
poultry producers during the difficult economic climate of the Great Depression 
(McEvoy 1986). Fishmeal, not canned fish for human consumption, was the substance 
of the California sardine industry, and it also fueled the expansion of the state’s chicken 
business through the transfer of marine proteins to the new industrial food chain.
The Peruvian and Chilean governments were also taking steps to develop industrial 
fisheries by the early 1940s, when some firms produced canned fish for export to 
U.S. markets. Many of the commercially-important pelagic fishes of the Eastern North 
Pacific – sardines, anchovy, mackerel, tuna, swordfish – are biologically similar or 
even indistinguishable from fish populations in the Humboldt Current. The Peruvian 
state-owned Guano Administration Company (Compañía Administradora de Guano, 
CAG) had been studying fishmeal production since the late 1930s, and had developed 
commercial ties with U.S. firms. Government officials and aspiring industrialists in 
Chile also preached zealously about the untapped potential of ocean resources (Lagos 
1940). During the 1940s, the governments of both countries commissioned studies by 
the U.S. Department of Fish and Wildlife (USFW) in attempts to identify opportunities for 
industrial development. However, one observer noted resistance to the new enterprise 
among some Chileans: “Natural resources seem almost limitless”, wrote U.S. Military 
Attaché Milton Hill (1945), “and the only real limitation is in the reluctance of Chilean 
capital to embark on new ventures”.
The United States’ military-technological imperative during World War II helped foster 
a novel vision of the Pacific Ocean among West Coast scientists who participated 
in wartime and early postwar research (Cushman 2004; Scheiber 1988). U.S. 
fisheries scientist and industry executive Wilbert Chapman heralded the “Pacific 
fisheries frontier” as the future of U.S. scientific and industrial expansion (Scheiber 
1988; McEvoy 1986). He subsequently spent much of his career attempting to build 
coalitions among commercial fisheries, government, and science. By the late 1940s 
the California sardine harvest was in precipitous decline, following its peak harvest 
of 791,100 tons in 1936 (FAO 2010a). In Monterey, fishmeal production ceased in 
1950, with the canneries operating only on fish trucked in from Southern California until 
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finally closing in 1957. When that industry went bust, state authorities set out to prevent 
the same fate from befalling the anchovy. In this context, Chapman, along with other 
prominent California scientists including Milner Schaefer, forged an inter-institutional, 
interdisciplinary oceanographic science that combined research in chemistry and 
physics with marine biology and data collection on upwelling and horizontal currents 
throughout the Pacific (Scheiber 1988). Perhaps presaging the rise of ecosystems-
based fisheries management later in the twentieth century, this movement towards 
the integration of disciplines in ocean science and a broad biogeographical approach 
across the “Pacific fisheries frontier” had roots in the political-scientific realignment of 
the immediate postwar years. 
Scientists of the “new oceanography” sought to understand the interactions of complex 
oceanic and climatic processes throughout the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, 
paving the way for the expansion of U.S. tuna and fishmeal interests in the coming 
decades. The University of California Scripps Institution of Oceanography (SIO) and the 
Hawaii-based Pacific Oceanic Fishery Investigations (POFI) were two key institutions 
in these early postwar research efforts. The collapse of the California sardine industry 
intensified the political-economic imperative to assess and develop the fisheries 
resources of the Pacific. One scientist involved in the USFW studies in Peru and Chile 
stated frankly to Chapman that he believed the California industry’s survival would 
depend on fish off the west coast of Latin America (Lobell 1948). In fact, between 1937 
and 1982, U.S. tuna producers were embroiled in what would become a protracted 
diplomatic conflict over access to migrating tuna (and until the 1960s, baitfish) off the 
coasts of Peru, Chile, and Ecuador.
North-South relations during the Cold War powerfully shaped the dynamics of “Big 
Science” and its patronage networks in the Pacific during the in 1950s and 60s, as U.S. 
technocrats sought to bring Latin American scientists into their sphere of influence in the 
context of large-scale projects to understand ocean-atmospheric interactions including 
El Niño (Cushman 2004). Many of the scientists who participated in the establishment, 
jointly with FAO funds, of nationally-based scientific research institutions in Peru and 
Chile – Instituto del Mar del Peru (IMARPE, 1960) and Instituto de Fomento Pesquero 
(IFOP, 1964) – had gained experience and training in the California Current or on 
FAO fisheries missions in other parts of the world (Ueber and MacCall 2005). South 
Americans also built successful careers by migrating north in pursuit of training, 
including Alejandro Bermejo, founder of the Peruvian fishing industry trade magazine 
Pesca, who studied with Schaefer in the United States. Bermejo and Schaefer, along 
with Gunnar Saetersdal, Ivo Tilic, and Bibiano Fernández Osorio-Tafall, and others, 
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were part of a transnational group of marine scientists who helped to build the world’s 
industrial fisheries through their studies in emerging fishing nations during this era. 
3. The FAO Mission and the Rise of National Fisheries in Chile and 
 Peru
In 1943, U.S. President F. D. Roosevelt convened a meeting of delegates from 44 
nations in Hot Springs, Virginia, to discuss the creation of a permanent institution “that 
would bring the new information in agriculture, science, and economics together in 
order to provide the world’s people with adequate nutrition” (Staples 2006: 77). The 
formal establishment of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in 1945 was 
the result of decades-long lobbying efforts by scientists and technocrats from the 
United States and Europe who sought to wage “a war against want” amidst the new 
international order that was beginning to take shape.
But the FAO was also plagued by tensions among member countries, and its policies 
reflected a compromise between its stated goals and the political-economic agendas 
of member countries. One of the primary questions facing leaders of the new institution 
was whether it would work to stimulate agricultural production and stabilize prices as 
a regulatory agency, or simply collect and distribute information as an advisory body. 
While developing nations were eager for food aid and local industrial development, 
U.S. and U.K. leaders were reluctant to sponsor a large-scale restructuring of global 
commodity markets that could disadvantage producers at home. In the face of this 
ongoing tension, the organization’s work – carried out mostly by appointed “expert” 
staff and mandated by biannual meetings of member nations – ultimately focused 
on technical assistance aimed at stimulating local food production rather than the 
international redistribution of resources from areas of agricultural surplus (Staples 
2006).
Even if the institution itself lacked a strong social mandate, the individuals who carried 
out its mission often did not. The first director of the FAO Regional Office for Latin 
America, Bibiano Fernández Osorio-Tafall, lamented that there was little emphasis 
on fish as a protein source and that FAO should work to change this view among 
the population (Osorio-Tafall 1950b). He believed that promoting the development 
of regional fisheries for food production was one of the international agency’s most 
important priorities. But without educational institutions for fisheries science in most 
South American nations, there was little locally-based research to support industrial 
development prior to the 1960s.
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In Chile, which faced widespread food shortages in the early 1950s, President Gabriel 
González Videla solicited international technical assistance for recommendations 
and financing. FAO and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) conducted an extensive study of agricultural production in 1951 (IBRD and FAO 
1952). That year the FAO fisheries technical assistance program also began its work. 
When they arrived, FAO experts from northern European fishing nations were notably 
disappointed with the state of the industry. One biologist complained about a lack of 
cooperation and even distrust between the fishermen and local Chilean technicians, a 
deplorable ignorance about “modern” fishing gear and motors, a lack of “competition” in 
the marketplace, and tariff barriers preventing the importation of adequate equipment 
(Einarssen 1950). Another FAO technician noted that Chilean fishermen “work in 
very primitive and sad conditions” despite the abundance of Chilean seas (Dirección 
General de Pesca y Caza 1954). More troubling to the FAO’s mission, however, was the 
reticence among industrialists in Peru and Chile to invest in the production of food fish. 
Such humanitarian priorities clashed with private industry’s export-oriented agenda 
and need for credit. Rather than foreign-led “technical assistance” whose terms would 
be dictated by an international agency, Peruvian and Chilean industrialists hoped to 
establish and operate their own fishing enterprises.
FAO’s early approach to fisheries focused more on issues of consumption and nutrition 
than on the significant structural impediments to marketing and distribution. One program 
involved a collaboration between a Danish fisheries economist, state authorities, and 
the Compañía Carbonífera e Industrial de Lota in organizing a “Fisheries Extension 
Program”, promoting the sale and consumption of fish through print, radio, theater, 
and even local schools (Hernández-Ponce 1953). Another consisted of Comités 
Pesqueros Locales aimed at educating housewives in the purchasing and preparation 
of fish (Gomez 1954). The FAO claimed a 45% increase in fish consumption in one 
district of Santiago following these campaigns. In the mid-1950s, the high rates of fish 
consumption during Semana Santa every April required the government to mobilize 
the nation’s entire fleet capacity from Iquique to Puerto Montt to supply Santiago for 
the holiday using airplanes.
The FAO also collaborated with the Chilean Nutrition Institute to develop recipes 
enriched with “fish flour” (also known as fish protein concentrate, or “FPC”), a type 
of fishmeal which has been processed using higher standards for raw material and 
sanitation practices, while also incorporating technologies to remove fishy odor and 
flavor. FAO-funded fellows from Chile studied “scientific baking” in the United States; 
the Chilean Nutrition Institute experimented with the use of fish flour in household 
recipes. In 1958, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) established a FPC plant 
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at Quintero on the central coast (Trivelli-Faranzolini 1954). But the UNICEF-Quintero 
project was plagued by administrative problems related to a lack of coordination among 
the various institutions involved (UNICEF, the Chilean National Health Service, and 
Swiss company ISESA, which also produced fishmeal at a separate plant in Quintero) 
and the lack of a centralized authority to control the product. The plant, which closed 
in 1965, produced only 15 tons of FPC which were used in trials in Chile and Peru. 
In all, international and national agencies carried out four separate projects to test or 
produce fish flour in Chile between 1953 and 1973, but none of them resulted in large-
scale commercial production of FPC (Pariser et al. 1978).
4. North-South Currents during the Fishmeal Boom
From 1950-1973, world fisheries harvests tripled while direct fish consumption 
remained stagnant (McEvoy 1986). The increased harvests, due in large part to 
Peruvian anchoveta landings, were used almost exclusively for the production of 
fishmeal for livestock feeds. Despite the rise of soymeal as a commodity competitive 
with fishmeal during the 1940s, Peruvian and Chilean fishmeal producers held a 
captive global market. By 1954, international demand for fishmeal was so strong that 
Chilean aviculturists complained that its exportation created a shortage for domestic 
feed producers, who that year would be forced to import a replacement product, a 
meat-based protein supplement imported from Argentina called carnarina (Hernández-
Ponce 1953). 
Scholars describe the 1950s as the era of the “designer chicken”, when U.S. breeders 
successfully experimented with hybridization to create broiler pedigrees that would be 
more marketable to consumer tastes; they also used genetics and nutritional science 
to manipulate the biological attributes of birds in order for them to grow bigger and 
faster (Boyd and Watts 1997; Boyd 2001; Bugos 1992). However, most studies on the 
rapid expansion of this industry in the United States have overlooked the importance 
of fishmeal. Particularly in the early postwar years, most poultry feeds relied on 
this commodity to provide the precisely-formulated nutrients that the birds required 
for growth (indeed, survival) on industrial farms, without the mobility and varied diet 
they would otherwise get by foraging seeds and insects. California poultry and swine 
producers remained “strongly loyal” to fishmeal, even when prices of competing 
commodities were low (McEvoy 1986: 199 note 59). Without it, California eggs and 
broilers became too expensive because the efficiency in production dropped, and they 
were unable to compete with those produced in the Midwest, where producers used 
soymeal and a synthetic amino acid to produce similar results (McEvoy 1986: 218 note 
58). Nonetheless, despite decades of industry efforts to find substitutes for fishmeal 
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in animal diets, even by the twenty-first century the available synthetic, plant, or other 
animal protein feedstuffs proved unable to produce the same results (Miles and Jacob 
1997; Palmer 2002). 
Whereas early FAO programs focused on building up Chilean markets, California 
industrialists flocked to Peru during the 1950s and 60s to invest in fishmeal. The demise 
of the sardine fishery in the North had created a surplus of boats and equipment for 
fishmeal processing amidst an increased demand for fishmeal on industrial chicken 
and hog farms. While fisheries scientists and government agencies in California, Chile, 
and Peru forged international institutional relationships, the infusion of capital and 
technology from North to South generated an economic impulse for the industrialization 
of Southeast Pacific sardine and anchoveta fisheries (later also jack mackerel). Some 
California fishing firms and families sold purse seiners: fishing boats which capture 
schooling fish such as tuna, sardines, and anchovies by encircling and cinching the 
net to form a “purse” (as shown in Figure 1). Others sold entire fishmeal plants to 
Southeast Pacific entrepreneurs, while U.S. firms such as Cargill and Ralston Purina 
established subsidiaries in the region. 
Figure 1: Purse Seine Net
Source: FAO 2001.
Peru imported mostly fishmeal and oil equipment, while California industrialists sold 
the newer and more expensive machinery to South Africa, another rising fishmeal 
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nation of the South. Southeast Pacific fishers adapted second-hand California seiners, 
called bolicheras in Peru and goletas in Chile, to local conditions for the anchoveta 
fishery (Ueber and MacCall 2005; see also print ads in Pesca 1960: passim). Local 
shipyards grew in importance as they produced new boats based on the “American” 
model, which proved well-suited to the relatively calm waters near the shore that were 
characteristic of Peru and Northern Chile. The equipment was easily adaptable and 
replicable due to the limited change in fishmeal technology and relatively light use of 
the machinery before the sardine crash. 
The infusion of capital and expertise in fisheries following World War II came to the 
Southeast Pacific not only from the U.S. West Coast and the FAO but also from 
Spanish and Italian immigrants. In 1968, near the height of the fishmeal boom, 41.73% 
of Peruvian fishmeal was produced by industrialists classified in one study as “recién 
llegados”, or recently arrived immigrants, while “national” concerns (which included the 
recién llegados) produced 61.60%. Spanish-born fishermen were reportedly the first 
to spot large schools of anchoveta off the coast of Peru (Abramovich 1973). Peruvian 
fishmeal magnate Luis Banchero Rossi was the son of Italian immigrants. Italian-born 
Anacleto Angelini immigrated to the Northern Chilean coast in 1948. Angelini started his 
career by investing in a once-failing fishmeal plant, Pesquera Eperva, later expanding 
from fisheries into forestry, copper, and petroleum. Angelini eventually became one of 
the most powerful figures in Chile, ranking number 119 on Forbes magazine’s list of 
billionaires before his death in 2007 (Forbes.com 2007).
Northern capital was also fundamental to the foundation of Peruvian and Chilean 
industrial fisheries during the boom. Because poultry feed was the most significant 
cost in broiler production, it “became a source of competitive advantage” (Horowitz 
2006). In 1960, Ralston Purina established fishmeal plants in Chimbote, Culebras, 
and Ilo, Peru. New York-based International Proteins Corporation, along with U.S. feed 
producers Star Kist, Cargill, Gold Kist, and Hamburg, Germany-based Gildemeister, 
were among the foreign-owned firms which accounted for 21.33% of the Peruvian 
fishmeal produced in 1968 (Abramovich 1973). U.S. pharmaceutical concern Pfizer 
and Company also installed a fishmeal plant in Iquique, Chile, and purchased a fleet of 
boats equipped with echo-sounding and spotter planes to supply it (Pensack, Bethke, 
and Kennard 1964; 1966).
U.S. feed producers engaged in backward integration in order to secure their supplies 
of fishmeal, the most effective known protein-source for chicken and hog feeds – and 
one of the most expensive and volatile inputs (Horowitz 2006; Boyd 2001; Bugos 1992; 
Abramovich 1973). By establishing operations in Peru and Chile, firms also reduced 
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their financial vulnerability to international price swings in case of fluctuating production. 
Like other agricultural commodities, fishmeal supplies relied on the productivity of 
natural ecosystems, and production throughout the year was not constant but rather 
concentrated in a few months when the target species were abundant. The Southeast 
Pacific Ocean climate undergoes strong fluctuations in atmospheric and oceanographic 
conditions every five to seven years, dramatically impacting fish reproduction and 
distribution. Depending on the seasonal production of other fishmeal producing 
countries as well as quantities in reserve, the price on the international market could 
at times drop below the cost of production; or it could skyrocket, driving up demand for 
other protein sources such as soymeal. 
Peru was the epicenter of a spectacular boom in fishmeal made from whole anchoveta 
from 1957-1972 (see Figure 2). Abundant fish stocks located close to the coast, 
comparatively low capital requirements, and a lack of government regulation promised 
high profits, resulting in a meteoric rise in fishmeal production almost overnight. By 
1960 Peru was the world’s top producer of fishmeal, and by 1964 it was the leading 
fishing nation altogether, accounting for 40% of total global fish production (9 million 
tons) in terms of weight (Coull 1974; Lux 1971). In 1967, 70 to 80% of U.S. fishmeal 
imports for broiler feeds were from Peru (FAO 1967).
Figure 2: Landings of Anchoveta (Engraulis Ringens) in Chile and Peru during 
the First Boom Era
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Peru’s dominance as the principal fishmeal producer on the global market empowered 
national entrepreneurial elites vis-à-vis their capital-rich Northern counterparts. Amidst 
a crisis in world fishmeal prices, in October 1960 producers convened in Paris and 
established a quota system in which Peru won 60% of the global total, 600,000 tons 
(Pesca 1960). Banchero Rossi, who represented Peru at the meeting, then formed 
the National Fishing Consortium, which controlled over 90% of the country’s fishmeal 
production and monopolized its commercialization in the commodity markets (Banchero 
Rossi 1972). Rosemary Thorp and Geoffray Bertram (1978) argued that fishmeal 
was “the only really successful locally-controlled export sector of the period”. Foreign 
penetration in the Peruvian industry occurred to a limited extent from 1962-1965, but by 
the end of the decade it stagnated and some firms had begun to withdraw. Fishmeal is 
distinct from other South American export commodities in that, despite the importance 
of foreign capital in the industry’s early years, Peruvian and Chilean entrepreneurs 
have had a relatively greater proportion of ownership; magnates such as Banchero 
Rossi and Angelini represent the creation of non-traditional national elites through this 
industry. Not unlike the foreign firms that arrived on the coast during the boom, both 
men focused their entrepreneurial efforts overwhelmingly on fishmeal for export.
While the Peruvian anchoveta remained the global center of this new industry, a smaller 
stock of the tiny fish also swam off northern Chile, along with other species ideally 
suited to fishmeal production (mainly Spanish sardines and jack mackerel) due to their 
abundance and high oil content. Producers in the north of Chile hoped to emulate Peru’s 
commercial success, and the Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (CORFO) 
actively promoted rapid development in the sector with credits and investments in 
infrastructure in Iquique, still suffering from economic depression following the collapse 
of international nitrate markets decades earlier. By the end of the 1960s, the South 
American fishmeal boom was in full swing, with Peruvian anchoveta harvests reaching 
an all-time high of over 13 million tons in 1971 (FAO 2010b). However, in 1972 excessive 
fishing pressure combined with the oceanographic impact of El Niño resulted in a 
devastating collapse of anchoveta stocks, sending the industry and global commodity 
markets into crisis and marking the end of this first boom phase in Southeast Pacific 
fisheries.
however, nearly all of the anchoveta catch was used for this purpose. Although this species is not 
(and was not) the only species used in fishmeal production, due to its prime importance, especially 
among Peruvian fishery landings, it serves as an emblematic – if singular – case that illustrates the 
dramatic nature of the rise of this global commodity during the postwar era.
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5. Closing the “Protein Gap”: Fish Protein Concentrate (FPC) in 
 the 1960s 
In the United States, during the Humboldt Current boom years of the 1960s, there 
were renewed calls to promote FPC and its use in undernourished populations. This 
discussion took place, however, without any reflection on the causes of previous 
failures in attempts to produce fish protein concentrate commercially. Promoters of FPC 
continued to call attention to its potential to bridge the so-called “protein gap” between 
populations in the developing world who had little access to proteins and consumers 
in industrialized countries, whose residents ate more meat than ever before. But after 
1961 FPC became the subject of a protracted debate over the product’s suitability 
for human consumption in the United States, which centered around a legal conflict 
between the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Bureau of Commercial 
Fisheries over its approval for commercial use and domestic distribution. Time magazine 
depicted fish flour as a kind of superfood that not only “can restore balance to the diet 
at a daily cost of only half a cent per person”, but “is virtually odorless and tasteless” 
and “blends well in soups, noodles, gravy, bread – even cookies and milk shakes” 
(Time Magazine 1967). One industry executive boasted about the possibilities of using 
FPC as an additive in foods as varied as Coca-Cola, spaghetti sauce, or tortillas (San 
Juan 1970). Unlike fishmeal for animal feeds, FPC was produced using higher quality 
standards for the raw material and special chemical processes designed to eliminate 
odor and flavor and to produce a fine powder that could be easily incorporated into 
foods. However, despite its technological and biological promise and considerable 
institutional support from both the U.S. government and the private sector, fish flour 
ultimately failed once again to meet commercial expectations.
In 1961 a panel of fishmeal experts recommended a joint Peru-Chile program as 
top priority for fish protein concentrate “action programs”, some of which were 
already underway (FAO 1962a). U.S. and FAO experts traveled to Peru to evaluate 
the possibilities for the industry, though FAO did not end up building a plant (FAO 
1962b). In an era when the fishmeal industry was booming, Peruvian policymakers 
were enthusiastic about producing FPC and industrialists looked to expand into new 
markets. Like the Chileans, they hoped to obtain, install, and operate the equipment 
necessary to produce it domestically (FAO 1962b). Peruvian government and 
industrialists built facilities and conducted clinical testing of fish flour. At least one FPC 
product was patented and licensed to Carlos Varrando Bruera in 1962-64, which was 
produced by a company called CIVSA and used in a bread enrichment program and 
a school breakfast program sponsored by the Ministry of Public Health. The Peruvian 
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firm Nicolini Hermanos, S.A., also experimented with using FPC in enriched noodles 
(Pariser et al. 1978). 
At the same time, the U.S.-based VioBin Corporation, which produced and exported 
FPC in New Bedford, Massachusetts, from 1954-71, requested approval from the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for distribution of the product in the domestic 
market (Ruthlow 1979). The FDA initially objected on the basis that fish flour made 
from whole fish is “filthy” and “adulterated” due to the use of whole fish and thus is 
not suitable for human consumption (Pariser et al. 1978). The FDA investigated the 
“wholesomeness” of FPC and its acceptability in U.S. markets through laboratory 
analyses, market research, media campaigns, and senate hearings, finally approving 
its production in 1967, with significant restrictions. Meanwhile, state agencies in Chile 
and Peru continued their work to develop the product for local populations – the original 
stated goal of the United Nations pilot projects during previous decades.
Following a protracted public debate, FDA approval for FPC in U.S. markets strategically 
came through just as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
program “Food from the Sea for Undernourished People of the World” was preparing to 
get underway. AID selected Chile, along with Morocco and Korea, as the sites for three 
FPC feasibility studies (Pariser et al. 1978). The Chilean government took an active role 
in attempting to implement fish flour nutrition programs, but the USAID program aimed 
to develop overseas markets for FPC produced in the United States, not necessarily to 
stimulate local industry in the recipient country. After some confusion among Chilean 
officials who thought the U.S. was offering to install a pilot plant, they agreed to accept 
a 250-ton shipment of FPC produced by Alpine Marine Protein Industries (owner of the 
production rights to the VioBin process as of 1967). Of the original 1000 tons Alpine 
contracted with USAID to produce, only 172 tons were acceptable for shipment by 
USAID; 100 of those were allotted to Chile. Only 500 kg of FPC actually arrived at 
the Santiago airport. Worst of all, Chilean bioassays determined that the product was 
of poor quality – inferior even to what remained from the Quintero plant production 
(Pariser et al. 1978). By December 1969 USAID had frozen the feasibility study and 
terminated its contract with Alpine. USAID had also contracted General Oceanology, 
Inc., a Cambridge, Massachusetts-based consulting firm, to conduct a study of FPC 
beginning in 1968, which the firm completed without regard for previous work that 
had been done, finally presenting its report in June 1970. However, by that time, 
administrative shifts under Nixon, who terminated the Office of the War on Hunger 
and reduced the Food from the Sea Program, and political turmoil in Chile ended U.S. 
efforts to promote FPC there (Pariser et al. 1978). 
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Although FAO withdrew from the FPC program at the Quintero plant in 1968, the Chilean 
Fisheries Development Institute (IFOP) improved the FPC production process. IFOP 
scientists proposed to build a “multiple protein complex” for industrial production of a 
variety of fish-based products from a variety of marine sources, depending on supplies 
of raw material and prices on the international market (Pariser et al. 1978: 152-53). 
However, due to the turmoil and regime change in Chile during the early 1970s, these 
plans never came to fruition.
At the 1968 meeting of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, U.S. 
ambassador Arthur Goldschmidt distributed chocolate chip cookies enriched with 
fish flour to his colleagues. While the diplomats were “munching happily away”, the 
Los Angeles Times reported, Goldschmidt presented them with a variety of products 
– pasta, cereals, “high-protein soft drinks resembling chocolate milk”, “cola-type 
beverages”, and baby food – designed by U.S. firms for sale and distribution in 
“protein-short areas” (Los Angeles Times 1968). But in the context of an institution 
that had been experimenting with FPC in the developing world for nearly two decades, 
the ambassador’s overture seemed almost comically out-of-touch. By then, as USAID 
embarked on a final, unsuccessful attempt to promote FPC, business was losing 
interest in its potential to become a profitable enterprise. Yet Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT) scientists suggested that marketing and distribution of the product 
among protein-deficient populations with little purchasing power would be difficult, 
arguing that FPC was “economically not necessarily the solution for developing 
countries” (Pariser et al. 1978; Keil 1969). Sensing that the fishing bonanza in the 
Southeast Pacific was nearing its end, one U.S. fisheries executive had already begun 
to look elsewhere for new sources of raw material: “I’ve always felt that there must be 
two or three other ‘Perus’ around the world. [...] But our goal is a good business, not 
just a lot of fish” (Cohen 1969). 
At least 40 countries made documented attempts to develop and commercially produce 
fish-based protein concentrates for human consumption from the 1930s to the 1970s, 
none of which had resulted in large-scale production (Pariser et al. 1978). Among 
the numerous institutions involved in the production trials of FPC, clashing goals 
and approaches, and a lack of communication due to inefficient and disconnected 
bureaucracies all contributed to the demise of this transnational project to use 
concentrated fish proteins to feed humans. In an era when international concern about 
hunger and food security was at a peak, the world’s oceans became a new frontier for 
the science and technology of food production. But in order to operate the industry for 
the benefit of the hungry, state or intergovernmental subsidies needed to finance the 
costs because the product had an insufficient commercial market.
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6. Conclusion
In the Kennedy-era vision of social policy, fish flour appeared to offer a simple 
technological solution to a situation that reflected vast structural inequalities in wealth 
and resource distribution at the global scale. By administering fish proteins to the poor, 
they hoped to avoid a social revolution while still sidestepping true social reform. As 
Pariser et al. (1978: 232) suggested, “high technology nutrition interventions” such as 
FPC – which failed to actually increase the protein/calorie supply for those at “nutritional 
risk” or increase their economic demand – “are to one degree or another only token 
palliatives offered by wealthy nations or local ruling elites in lieu of addressing the 
social and political factors underlying malnutrition”. The projects in Chile and Peru 
failed to establish any successful, continuously-producing commercial FPC plant.
Instead the two countries had by the 1960s become the world’s top producers of 
fishmeal. Requiring less capital investment in machinery and personnel, unrefrigerated 
anchovies and sardines processed into fishmeal with rudimentary technology and 
production process, fishmeal proved to be more profitable to most firms. Canneries 
used imported machinery and metals, more workers, and more stringent sanitation 
standards, while fishmeal required little human labor and the fish were often processed 
rotten, thus reducing costs on land. Fish were so abundant and cheap they were even 
labeled as “trash”; raw material supplies were thus readily available during production 
seasons.
The demise of the U.S. FPC program cleared the way for industrial production of 
fishmeal for export. Millions of tons of nutrients were extracted from the Humboldt 
Current marine ecosystem each year and shipped to distant markets in the service of 
industrial livestock production. North-South exchanges of technology and expertise 
leading to the fisheries’ industrialization were shaped by the U.S. Cold War political 
agenda and foreign economic interests. But the FPC projects failed because of a lack 
of interest among industrialists and the need for subsidization by the state or FAO, in the 
context of high global demand for animal feed commodities. The commercial success 
of FPC or the increase of any domestic fish consumption also required significant 
investment in local infrastructure and markets in order to distribute products to protein-
poor provinces away from the coast. The post-World War II history of Humboldt 
Current fishmeal production demonstrates how local and regional inequalities become 
entangled with global economic processes as workers and industrialists transformed 
nature into commodities for trade, circulation, and consumption in international markets.
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When the Peruvian anchoveta fishery collapsed in 1972, the crisis it produced was 
not primarily humanitarian but political-economic in nature, as Northern farmers faced 
a shortage of fishmeal and thus a rise in prices of chickens, eggs, and pigs. Rather 
than closing the “protein gap”, the advances in fishing technology, nutrition science, 
and food processing capabilities that created this industry contributed primarily to the 
foundation of powerful business empires – both nationally, in Peru and Chile, and in 
the United States – that extracted and processed huge quantities of Southeast Pacific 
anchovies and sardines to feed industrially-farmed animals.
Marine capture fisheries in Peru and Chile today remain overwhelmingly focused on the 
production of fishmeal and oil, despite fluctuating supplies and competition on global 
markets from other protein commodities such as soymeal. Facing restricted supplies 
due to harvest quotas as well as pressure from conservationists to process the fish 
in smaller quantities for direct human consumption, some firms are beginning to shift 
their production strategies to include a higher proportion of these value-added items 
(see, for example, The Economist 2011). Yet while the Peruvian gastronomy industry is 
booming (Matta 2011; Lauer and Lauer 2006), grave problems of malnutrition persist, 
particularly among indigenous Andeans. In the inland freshwater lakes of southern 
Chile, on the other hand, the rapid expansion of salmon farming has been fueled by 
fish oil produced in the coastal cities of Talcahuano and Iquique and imported from 
Peru. The collapse of the industry due to virus outbreaks and its subsequent relocation 
to even more remote regions further south reminds us that, besides its dependence 
on wild-caught marine proteins for feed, natural resource-based “development” is 
ephemeral when consideration for ecological sustainability is not incorporated into the 
business plan (Soluri 2011; Deutsch et al. 2007). Recent studies highlight the central 
importance of forage fish in the marine ecosystem, especially for marine mammals in 
Peru (Pikitch et al. 2012). At the heart of the debate over the management of marine 
proteins derived from the anchoveta, sardines, and mackerel of the Humboldt Current 
are key questions of justice and sustainability that continue to demand urgent attention 
from scholars and policymakers, both locally and globally.
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